Li Bo | The Political Economy of Anti - Bribery Law Enforcement
Recently, Tsinghua UniversityWudaokou School of FinanceCenter for International Finance and Economic Research (CIFER) and Tsinghua UniversityWudaokou School of FinanceThe 2020 International Trade Disputes and Globalization Restructuring Academic Symposium, jointly organized by the Cross-border Digital Capital Research Center (IDC),2020 International Conference on US-China Trade Disputes and Reforms in GlobalizationThe online meeting was successfully held. Li Bo, Assistant Professor at Tsinghua University's PBC School of Finance, attended and shared his insights with Lauren H. Cohen of Harvard Business School and NBER.TitleThe Political Economy of Anti-Bribery Enforcement《The Political Economy of Anti-Bribery EnforcementThe article.
Dr. Li Bo is currently an Assistant Professor at Tsinghua University's PBC School of Finance. She graduated from Queen's University in Canada in 2013 with a PhD in Economics. Prior to that, she held a Master's degree from the University of British Columbia and a Bachelor's degree (highest honors) in Economics from Western University. She interned at Oppenheimer Financial, working on reverse mergers; she also interned at the Canadian Embassy in the United States, analyzing multilateral trade policies. Her work at the Canadian Embassy included attending briefings on Capitol Hill and analyzing issues related to the financial crisis.
Her research interests include empirical corporate finance, with a focus on financial distress, creditor control, and government policy. Her recent working paper examined the effectiveness of China's anti-corruption campaign in reallocating credit from state-owned enterprises to non-state-owned enterprises. She is currently researching bankruptcy reform in China.
Li Bo
Article English Abstract
The Political Economy of Anti-Bribery Enforcement
Lü Yue
Professor Lü Yue of the School of International Economics and Trade at the University of International Business and Economics found the topic of this paper, "The Implementation of US Anti-Corruption Laws May Affect Elections," to be very interesting, cleverly designed, and with detailed data collection. After a brief summary, Professor Lü offered the following suggestions: 1. The FCPA is enforced by only two agencies: the Department of Justice (DOG) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), with the SEC being relatively neutral. However, the data in this paper shows that both agencies have consistent enforcement outcomes, which is logically confusing. Would the inconsistency in their results better support the research question? 2. From the baseline regression analysis, the explained variable includes three categories, mainly distinguished by whether the company's headquarters are in the United States. Would it be more accurate to exclude samples headquartered in the US before conducting relevant tests? 3. How should "foreign competition" be defined? Should it be the number of foreign companies with common customers, or the number of foreign companies in the same industry? 4. A more detailed explanation is needed regarding whether the supply chain data used in this paper is at the firm level or the industry level. 5. Further analysis of the relevant mechanisms, heterogeneity, and fixed effects is needed.
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